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1. Introduction
Tax policy and trade policy are alike because each affects the pattern of trade of goods
and factors among nations. The conceptual similarity of tax and trade policy has been
widely recognized and pursued in the context of models of perfect competition by, for
example, Dixit (1985) and by Gordon and Levinsohn (1990).
The apparent empirical importance of imperfect competition poses new questions for
optimal trade policy, many of which have been addressed by a series of papers on "strate-
gic" trade policy. These papers establish that there are situations in which government
intervention such as trade subsidies may improve national welfare by increasing domestic
firms' share of pre-tax profits.
The insights provided by the strategic trade policy literature have not been applied to
tax policy questions. Yet the same arguments used to justify export subsidies are used
in policy discussions to justify preferential tax treatment of U.S. multinationals. For ex-
ample, it is widely asserted that the U.S. system of taxing the foreign-source income of
its multinationals imposes a greater burden than is imposed on resident multinationals
by the tax systems of other developed countries, and therefore U.S. firms are placed at a
"competitive disadvantage." See, for example, Arthur Young and Company (1988). For a
general assessment of this argument, see Slemrod (1990). The idea is that a less burden-
some system would help U.S. multinationals gain a greater market share and, implicitly,
benefit the national interest.
In this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the
presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment.
We are grateful to participants at the 1990 NBER summer institute for helpful comments and espe-
cially thank Jim Hines.
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The models emphasize important differences in the practical application of tax and tariff
policy. Although international trade theory teaches us that trade taxes can be emulated by
domestic tax instruments (a tariff, for example, is equivalent to a production subsidy and
consumption tax at equal ad valorem rates), in reality this is not the case for two important
reasons. First, domestic tax policy is typically set at the national level while trade policies
are set at the industry level. While a tariff on imported sweaters may well be observed, a
sales tax unique to sweaters is almost never observed. The ability to target fiscal policy
to particular sectors is valuable because strategic policy is likely to be justifiable only for
certain industries.
Second, in the era of the global corporation, the administration of trade and domestic
tax policies imposes further non-equivalences. Trade policy operates at the border. As
goods enter or leave the country, they are taxed or subsidized. Trade taxes, though,
do not apply to goods produced abroad by domestically owned firms. For example, an
export subsidy paid to domestic sweater manufacturers for each sweater exported does
not generally apply to sweaters produced in Hong Kong and exported to a third country.
Corporate taxes on resident corporations, though, are often applied on a worldwide basis.
For example, the income earned by a multinational from sweater production either in the
U.S. or in Hong Kong is subject to U.S. corporate taxes, although perhaps at different
effective rates.
In this environment, what does optimal policy imply? Does a government tax (or sub-
sidize) domestically owned firms and how does it set tariff policy? Targeting of incentives
at the industry level can be accomplished using trade policies, but these will distort the
firm's outward direct foreign investment which in turn alters the trade tax base. Alterna-
tively, incentives that do not discriminate against outward direct foreign investment can
be accomplished using national tax policy, but these taxes typically cannot discriminate
between industries. Finally, any attempt to realistically model interactions between taxes,
tariffs, and the global firm must allow for the possibility that the firm is an oligopolist.'
In this paper, we investigate international trade and tax policy when the location of an
oligopolistic firm's production is endogenous to the policies set by a government.
1 See, for example, the introduction of Ethier and Horn (1990).
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in section 2 by investigating tax and trade
policy in a single industry economy. There we find that optimal strategic policy is imple-
mented without regard to the location of production, thus preserving production efficiency.
Tariff policy, which cannot apply to dfi and therefore cannot be uniform in its effect on
home and foreign production, is dominated by tax policy.
In section 3 we investigate how the introduction of a second, non-strategic industry
changes our single industry results. We investigate optimal policy when only tax policy is
available and when tax and trade policy may be used in tandem. We find that when indus-
tries differ in the appropriateness of strategic intervention, optimal tax policy, which alone
cannot be industry-specific, abandons productive efficiency in favor of the non-uniform
policy which maximizes the strategic gain net of excess burden. Ideally, industry-specific
tariff policy is combined with general tax policy. We find that here too, the production
efficiency that characterizes domestic tax policy with perfect competition is in general
abandoned.
Section 4 concludes the paper. There, we suimmarize the policy implications of our
models of tax and trade policy in the presence of imperfectly competitive multinational
firms.
2. The Simplest Story
We begin with the simplest story - an international duopoly in which production in a
common third country is possible. Even this simple story is an extension to the literature
on international tax policy in the presence of direct foreign investment (dfi). Brander
and Spencer (1987), Levinsohn(1989) and Horstman and Markusen(1988) each investigate
how trade policy interacts with inward dfi. Brander and Spencer include unemployment
in a model in which the government sets a tariff on imports from the foreign monopolist
exporting to the home country or output taxes on the foreign monopolist's dfi production.
They show that in the presence of unemployment, the home government will choose to
set output taxes below tariffs, hence inducing the foreign monopolist to prefer dfi over
exporting. Levinsohn investigates tariffs and quotas in oligopolistic industries when the
foreign firm(s) can jump the quota by investing directly in the home country. He shows
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that under certain cost conditions, the presence of inward dfi as quota-jumping is evidence
of sub-optimal trade policy and that optimal tariffs and quotas are equivalent. Horstman
and Markusen demonstrate the important role of firm-specific and plant-specific fixed costs
in a model of inward dfi. There, dfi alters market structure, which in turn has ramifications
for optimal policy.
Much international competition, though, now takes place with production in third
countries. As a running illustration, we will consider IBM, a U.S. based firm, and the
Japan based firm Fujitsu. Each firm produces where they are based and in Singapore.
Simultaneous production in two countries by one firm is consistent with rising marginal
costs in each location. If marginal costs were constant, a cost-minimizing firm would
produce its entire output at the cheapest locale. Following Brander and Spencer (1985),
we will assume that all production is exported. Finally, we assume that the firms set
quantities as their strategic variable. 2
The set-up
We establish notation at the outset.
QI is output by the home firm that takes place in the home country.
Qi is output by the home firm that takes place in the third country.
Qi is total output by the home firm, so that Q1 = Q1 + Qi.
QZ is output by the foreign firm that takes place in the foreign country.
Qz is output by the foreign firm that takes place in the third country.
Q2 is total output by the foreign firm, so that Q2 = Q2 + Q3-
To fix ideas, for example, Q1 would be IBM computers produced in Singapore while Q2
are Fujitsu computers produced in Singapore. We will assume that the duopolists produce
differentiated products and the price of a product does not depend on where the product
is actually produced. An IBM product produced in both the U.S. and Singapore sells for
a single price. Inverse demand functions are denoted by
P" = P'(Q1,Q2),
2 It is well understood that firms' mode of market conduct matters when considering optimal policy.
See Eaton and Grossman (1986). We will return to this assumption later.
P
2 -P 2 (Q 1  Q2).
Denoting partial derivatives of price with subscripts, we impose the following standard
properties on demand:
P1, P2 < 0 (Downward sloping demand),
P1, P1? <0 (Substitutes),
P' = P2 (Symmetry), and
P1P22> PJPi (Negative Semi - Definiteness.)
For simplicity we will assume that inverse demands are linear. 3
The total cost of producing Qi is given by C11 = Cl1 (Qi) and the marginal cost of
producing QI is denoted Cit. Ci 3(Ql) is the total cost of producing Qi and the marginal
cost of producing Qi is C13 . The terms C22, C42, C2 3, and C23 are analogously defined.
Consistent with the observed phenomenon of simultaneous production at home and abroad
by a given firm, we assume increasing marginal costs. For simplicity, we assume these are
linear. Hence, Cl'i, Ci', C2, and C2'a > 0 and third derivatives of the total cost function
are zero.
A tax (possibly negative indicating a subsidy) by the home country on output produced
at home (QI) is given by ti while a tax on output produced abroad (Qf) is given by t3.
Taxes levied by the third country (Singapore's taxes on IBM and Fujitsu) are given by t1 .
We will assume the foreign country levies only a tax on output produced at home and this
tax is given by t2.
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In practice, there are a number of different tax schemes and the taxes paid by a corpo-
ration will depend on which scheme a government adopts.- Territorial taxation, sometimes
called 'water's edge taxation.' implies that the taxes paid by the multinational firm, T, are
given by:
Allowing concave or convex inverse demands does not change the story we tell and adds complicating
notation.
4 Our conclusions are robust to the more complicated story in which the foreign government levies a tax
on output abroad also.
S The taxes we consider are levied on output rather than income. Modelling output taxes allows us to
more easily draw on the symmetries between trade and tax policies. An alternative approach is to model
income taxes, but this would force us to treat some issues that, while interesting (such as the desirability





Here the firm pays the taxes that apply at the location of production, and the firm receives
no credits for taxes paid abroad nor is production abroad taxed by the home country. This
system is followed by France, the Netherlands, and other countries. Note that this tax
scheme is also that which applies when trade policy is the government's sole policy tool as
production abroad is not taxed or subsidized by the home country.
Another common system, followed by Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., is to tax the
worldwide income of resident corporations but allow a credit against domestic tax liability
for taxes paid to foreign governments. In practice, the credit is usually limited to the
domestic tax liability on the foreign-source income and the tax on foreign-source income is
deferred until subsidiaries' income is repatriated. Ignoring these considerations, total tax
under a worldwide system would be equal to,
T =tQQ + t1Qi + (ti - t 1)Qi = t,(Q1+Q1),
so that the total effective tax on income is ti regardless of source.
Finally, the firm might be subject to taxes imposed by the home country on worldwide
income and taxes paid to the third country are simply treated as a cost of business and
are therefore not creditable. In this case,
T=t1Qi +(t +±tj)QI.
If the same rate applies to production abroad and at home, this becomes
T = t1Ql -+(ti-+ ty)Qi-
Although no country has adopted this system of taxing foreign-source income, it is the
tax scheme which, in models of perfect competition, is typically optimal from the home
government's perspective, holding the tax system of the other countries constant, because
it ensures that production location decisions will be efficient from the national perspective.
Optimal Policy with Endogenous Outward Dfi
In this section, we ask what optimal government policy should be when Cournot
duopolists who produce off-shore as well as at home compete.. The domestic tax and
international trade literatures each have considered similar questions. Were it not for po-
tential outward dfi, our set-up would be identical to the simplest Brander-Spencer story in
which the home government would find it optimal to subsidize domestic output in order
to shift pre-tax profits to the home firm. Were it not for the imperfect competition aspect
of our model, our set-up would be the same as those that indicate a government ought
to treat taxes paid by domestic firms to foreign governments as simply another business
expense. We first derive the optimal policy, then discuss its implications for the choice of
policy tools.
The domestic firm's after-tax profits, 1', and foreign firm's after-tax profits, n2 are
given by:
ni 1= P'(Qi,Q2) (Qi + Qi) - C11(Q ) - C13(Qi) - t1Q1 - (t3 + tf)Qi.
l12 = p 2 (Q1,Q2 ) (Qz + Q2) - C,2 (Q ) - C23 (QZ) - tQ 2 - t1Q3.




---- =0 = P -C' -(t 3 +tf)+ Q1Pi,
aQi
while those of the foreign firm are:







O2OH= 2P'- C,- t±Q2P22. (6)
Taken pairwise, (3) and (4) like (5) and (6) imply that a firm should on the margin
be indifferent about where the marginal unit of production occurs. Following the well-
established methodology of Dixit (1984), we differentiate the firms' first order conditions
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This system, albeit simplified by the assumptions of linear marginal costs, linear inverse
demands, and Cournot competition, is still difficult to work with when searching for readily
interpretable solutions. Here we depart from Dixit's methodology and make use of the fact
that the first matrix in (7) has a special form. In particular, the home firm's decisions
depend only on the total of the foreign firm's output, but not on where the foreign firm
decides to produce. Likewise, the foreign firm is not influenced by where the home firm
produces.
Let A = -P dQ2 and B = -PidQ1 . Then system in (7) can be decomposed into two
subsystems. The subsystem for the home firm is given by:
(2P - Ci' 2Pi dQ dt1 +A
2Pi 2Pi - Cis dQi / \dta + dt f + A.4 '
The subsystem for the foreign firm is analogously derived.
2P22- C2## 2P22 dQz dts + B
. (9)2P2 2PI-C / \dQs dt+B
We will return to the comparative statics results given by these subsystems when analyzing
welfare implications of policy choices. For now, though, note that solving (8) for dQi and
dQi defines dQ1 and likewise for (9) and dQ2. Doing this allows us to rewrite (7) in a
much more manageable form.
(2Pj{C' + Cs) - C{'C{'a P?(Ci'i + C1'3) dQ1  (C'(dt3 + dt1f) + Cadt1
(2 P(C + C ) 2P=(C" + C~C) - C«C' dQ2 ) \  C;'2dt; + C'3dt )
(10)
Following Dixit, we will assume that a firm will increase its output (Qi or Q2) if it perceives
a positive marginal profit from so doing. This implies that a sufficient condition for the
stability of (10) is that:
[2P(Cii' + Ci's) - C1'C1i(2P (C 's + Cii) - C'2C3J - [ P(C' + C'a)J[P?2(C2's + C )J > 0.
2Pi(Ci' + Ci') - Ci'iC{'a < 0,
2P(C2 + C's) - C'C < 0.
(11)
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The comparative statics that result from (8), (9), and (10) are fairly intuitive. It is
straightforward to show, for example, that total output by the home firm will always fall
with the imposition of a tax on its output either at home or abroad. That is, and
< 0.6 Foreign aggregate output, Q2, rises with the imposition of domestic taxes,
so 9 and > 0. Finally, the domestic firm adjusts its pattern of production in
response to the imposition of domestic taxes. In particular, g < 0 and g < 0.
The response of domestically produced output to a change in the tax on output produced
abroad and the response of dfi output to a change in the domestic tax rate are ambivalent
in sign, but knowing that i and . < 0 places bounds on the size of this effect.
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Suppose, for example, that the home country was contemplating an increase in the tax
on output abroad. Then the oligopolistic multinational firm could be expected to respond
by decreasing output produced abroad, maybe produce more at home and maybe produce
less, but certainly aggregate production by the domestic firm falls.
The home government maximizes welfare, W, which, since there is by assumption no
domestic consumption, is given by after-tax profits plus home tax revenues, or, equivalently,
pre-tax profits less tax payments made to the foreign government.
W = P'Q -C 11 -C 13 -t1QI (12)
The home government has, in a first best case, two policy tools, t1 and t3 . Taking the
taxes set by foreign governments as given, we first ask what the optimal tax on outward
dfi is. Maximizing welfare with respect to t3 yields,
-- =0 o= tPs -- a+r e sc ro + P2 e t oCllo a--- ge - ( rC13 + t e A)pp
&3a a at &3a a
= P1 Q + Q1 P Q + pz - C' - (_ Ci, + ti - t3 )
= P1 --- + Q1 Pl -- + P2 --- - C11 --- - ( t1 - t3 )--




ti - t3 = aQ (P1 + P;'Qi - Cif) 1I+ QiPz ,Q (13)
where t3 denotes the optimal tax on output produced abroad.
The home government simultaneously sets the optimal tax on domestic production.
Manipulations similar to those used to arrive at (13) yield the following expression for ti.
1 ''- + = ( Pl Q1 - Cli)a+L +Q 1P ), (14)
Taken as a system, (13) and (14) implicitly define the optimal taxes on domestically
produced and exported output and output produced abroad. Some manipulation is re-
quired to obtain closed form solutions.
First note that by applying Cramer's rule to (10), it is straightforward to prove that:
1Q 1 C .Q, and O 2 = -Q2
0t 1 C'3 ta 3 at, C1'3  at3
This implies that Q, and Q2 adjust in a constant proportion to changes in either t1 or t3.
It is useful to define the ratio of these changes as:
dQ2/dt 3  dQ 2/dt, - 8 <0.
dQ1/dt3  dQ/dt .(1)
Making use of this term, and noting that (3) implies P1 + QP,' - C1 = t1, we can rewrite
(13) and (14) as:
t1 - t; = t1 +Q.P23] (13')L9Qilot&3
_- a [l\t,+QiPJ3] (14')
It is straightforward (though tedious) to show that, even when all firms have identical
technology, Q will not in general equal . If both equations characterizing
optimal policy are to hold,
The optimal policy given by (16) is interesting on several counts. The home government-
should subsidize equally domestic and dfi output, thus avoiding the inefficiency in the
location of production. The optimality of levying taxes that do not discriminate by location
is thus preserved when strategic considerations are introduced.
The optimality of a subsidy instead of a tax directly follows from the assumption of
Cournot competition. In this sense, the results are in line with the intuition imparted by
the simpler Brander-Spencer profit shifting models. Had we modeled competition with
price as the strategic variable, we conjecture but do not prove that optimal policy would
become an export and dfi tax instead of subsidy.
More intuition about optimal policy can be obtained by rewriting (13) and (14) as,
t1 ( i +t; (- = -Q 1 Pz (-- and (13")
t. + t3 -gt 1 )-Q1P2-gQ- (14")
In this form, the right-hand side of each equation is the marginal domestic social benefit
of increasing a subsidy - the induced increase in the home good's price (multiplied by
the domestic firm's total output) resulting from the induced change in the foreign firm's
output. The left-hand side is the marginal domestic social cost - the excess burden of in-
ducing output beyond the efficient amount. Because the relationship between the marginal
induced price increase to the marginal excess burden is the same for each tax, they are
equalized when the two tax rates are identical.
Note that trade policy alone cannot achieve the optimum implied by (16). for trade
policy by itself cannot tax or subsidize operations abroad Because by assumption all
domestically produced output is exported, trade policy as typically administrated can
monitor and tax or subsidize this output but not dfi output.
' The optimal trade policy is derived by setting t while constrainin t3 to zero This yields,
6 o = -Q Pz dqI/dti '
which is identical to (16) except that in the denominator replaces 8-
. .C )- C(2P?(C'2 + C') -C.'2 '= = (C-QPC'3 ) Q < 0. (16)
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Because U.S. domestic tax policy taxes the worldwide income of its multinationals,
its tax system is set up to monitor income earned abroad. Thus, while trade policy in
this simple model cannot effectively achieve the welfare optimum, tax policy can. The
optimal tax policy turns out to be that in which all income, regardless of source, is taxed
(subsidized) uniformly and taxes paid to foreign governments are simply treated as another
business expense. One interpretation of (16) is that optimal policy targets the strategic
'distortion' without interfering with productive efficiency.'8
The above results suggest that trade policy alone is inferior to domestic tax policy alone
in the presence of multinational firms. (Without dfi, the optimal domestic tax policy and
trade policy are equivalent.) However, this result follows necessarily only if the economy
consists of just one industry. In any real economy, though, there are sure to be many
s That optimal taxes on firms are zero in the absence of a strategic motive (Pz = 0) and negative in its
presence may be surprising to students of taxation who are accustomed to positive taxes. These results,
of course, depend on the absence of a revenue requirement (and the Cournot assumption.) Introducing a
revenue requirement could generate positive taxes, but to solve this problem would require a full-blown
optimal taxation treatment. We do know, though, that if pure profits can be taxed and if a full set of com-
modity taxes is available, the optimal tax structure in the absence of international strategic considerations
will feature production efficiency, which in this case implies that is .= t.
Requiring that the two taxes themselves raise a fixed amount of revenue (for, perhaps, political reasons)
does change the results. To demonstrate this, maximize (12) subject to the constraint that tiQii + t3Q3
be a constant, and let r be the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. Then it can be shown that
ti=- - -Q1 P + ** *
rQi
1 3 - Q
and ti=--- -QP. 3+r '± h 9± ,
where A = -WI - .9j Q38t1 8 3  8 1 813
Clearly when r = 0, we are back to our earlier results. When r is not zero, t[ will equal t3 only when
Q1 -
Unless this condition holds, the revenue raised per excess burden will not be equal when the two taxes
are equal, and it will be optimal to tax at a higher rate the location for which output is relatively high
compared to its responsiveness to taxation.
i
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industries and not all will be Cournot duopolists facing identical inverse demand curves
- i.e. not all should be targeted for a subsidy. National tax policy, though, is not set on
an industry level.
9 
Although domestic tax policy can tax the worldwide income of firms
(and this is an advantage), it cannot typically set rates on an industry basis (and this is a
disadvantage.) In the following section. we extend our model to include a second i:edust r
that is perfectly competitive. We then re-examine somre of the above ;e'.:s
3. The multi-industry economy
We introduce a second domestic industry which is modeled identically to the first
industry except that it is assumed to treat the international price of its output as exogenous.
This captures the idea that the firm in each country is small in the world market for its
output. We will assume that while the home (or foreign) firm might receive a price for its
output strictly greater than its marginal cost, entry into the industry, for small changes
from the initial equilibrium, is not profitable. As in the imperfectly competitive industry,
the firms are assumed to engage in outward direct foreign investment. We refer to this
second industry as the non-strategic industry.
Notation for the non-strategic industry is the same as for the strategic industry except
small letters are used instead of capital letters. Hence qi is the total output by the home
firm of which Q11 is produced domestically and qi3 is produced abroad. This output sells
for the exogenous price p
1 .10
9 This is a slight exaggeration. Tax reform bills inevitably contain certain firm-specific provisions (known
as "transition rules") designed to shield fortunate firms from the negative consequences of the new tax law
Moreover, tax laws can be indirectly industry-specific. For example, the investment tax credit provided
more benefit to equipment and machinery intensive industries such as automobile manufacturing than it
did to other industries such as retailing and pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, we believe, as a generalization,
that trade policy is more industry-specific than tax policy. The legislatise processes by which trade and
tax policy are enacted reinforce this view. Tax policy is typically a congressional matter so that both
houses of Congress must approve such measures. This plausibly leads to broader policy than trade policy.
Much trade policy is set in response to particular trade disputes brought before the ITC, and these suits
are frequently very industry specific.
10 It does not make any difference to the results if the non-strategic industry produces a hoinogenous
instead of differentiated product. We continue with the differentiated good assumption in order to maintain
symmetry with the imperfectly competitive industry set-up.
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Domestic Tax Policy
We now investigate domestic optimal tax policy assuming that the tax rates on both
domestic and foreign corporate output cannot be industry specific. For now, trade policy
is assumed unavailable. This captures the idea that while the GATT restricts a nation's
ability to set trade taxes and subsidies, tax policy (including the tax treatment of foreign.
source income) is beyond GATT's reach. Is it still the case that the tax or subsidy rates
on domestic and foreign output are, at the welfare optimum, identical?
Profits for the home firm in the non-strategic industry are given by:
and
t 1-t = + (t1 +QOPz3) +t1 , (22)
Unlike the one industry case in section 2, it is no longer true that the first best solution
entails taxing (or subsidizing) domestic output and dfi output at equal rates. Hence, the
optimal domestic tax policy is no longer one which taxes all income equally and treats
taxes paid to foreign governments as a business expense. Income earned abroad may now
deserve special consideration.
Solving (21) and (22) for the optimal t1 and t3, we find that








1 8 + 8 
1 (OQ3 8Qs _ 8
t1 + dti St3 dt3 (OQ3 9s l ( 8g1 831l8t1 + dtt 8t3 + dt3
/ \ J
'ri = p'(qi + qi) - ci(qi) - cJ3(gi) - tig - (t3 + tf)gi.
(23)
(171
Foreign firm profits are:
= p
2 (qg + q) - c22(gq) - c23(gq) - t2q2 - t q. (iS
Profit maximization by the home firm implies that pi = c'n + ts = c'3 + t3 + t1f while for
the foreign firm p2 = cz2 + t2 = C23 + t1. Differentiating each firm's first order conditions
we show how firms respond to changes in the policy environment. This system is given by
-ciic 1s 0 dqi ca'13dt1 + c'i(dt3 + dt1f) iI. (101
0 -c22c 3  dq2  c22dt f + c2 3dt2
Home firm output, qi falls with a rise in either of the taxes on its output. Foreign firm
output, q2, is unaffected by the home country's tax policies since as the home firm cuts back
output in response to a tax, the world prices in the non-strategic industry are unchanged.
Home country welfare is now
and
( . + ) Q.P21#0 - + a QP2 .3a
t3 .+ 1) (81,3+1a4) e (24)
8at, dt, t +
It is straightforward to show that optimal policy is still a subsidy on domestic and foreign
output, albeit at perhaps differing rates. Also, in the absence of the non-strategic industry,
(23) and (24) reduce to the optimal policy in the one industry case given in (16).
More importantly, (23) and (24) provide appealing economic intuition about how the
home government ought to set the relative sizes of t, and t3. Substituting comparative
statics results gathered in the Appendix for how firms adjust outputs in response to policy
changes into (23) and (24) and comparing the magnitudes of optimal policies yields the
below result.
ItI itiff 3 >C13(25)
To interpret (25) with an illustrative example, suppose the imperfectly competitive firm is
still IBM and the non-strategic firm is Weyerhauser (W). Assume V produces at home as
well as in Malaysia. Then if IBM's dfi technology and their domestic technology are the
same (up to an intercept of the MC curve) and similarly for V, then the optimal subsidies
on domestic and dfi output are identical, and the optimal policy has the same form as it
did when there was only one industry in the economy.
15
W = P'Q1 -Ci - C13+p'qi -cII -c 13 -ti(Qi + qi). (20'
Differentiating this expression with respect to t1 and ta, respectively. and employing sub-
stitutions analogous to those used to derive (13) yields
1-3 ?-i0Q q
t -t3+ 1 (t1t+Q1 P p) t tj,
14
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Now suppose instead that all else is the same except the marginal cost curve for W's dfi
output is steeper than it is at home, and therefore foreign output less responsive to changes
in output price or cost. This might result if V has a smaller labor pool to draw upon at
their dfi plant than at their domestic plant. Equation (25) tells us that, since c' '3 > Ci',
It;i > ItI. That is, the subsidy is greater on W's domestic output. If the marginal cost
of W's domestic production were steeper than that of its dfi production, all else equal,
the subsidy would be greater on dfi output. This is because in the non-strategic sector,
subsidies cause excess burden with no offsetting strategic advantage. Hence, the optimal
policy will tend to avoid subsidizing the production in the locale where aggregate output
of the non-strategic sector is most responsive. That is, it will tend to avoid subsidizing the
locale where the non-strategic sector has a flatter marginal cost curve because the marginal
excess burden is greater there. Alternatively, it will tend to subsidize the locale where the
strategic sector has a flatter marginal cost curve. For a given amount of excess burden, the
strategic benefit of a subsidy is greater when it induces a greater domestic output response.
Thus, foreign production should be subsidized at a higher rate than domestic production if,
on the margin, more of the output of the strategic sector is produced abroad relative to the
non-strategic sector.
Taz and Trade Policy
We have shown that adding a second industry to the economy renders the uniform
treatment of domestic and dfi output non-optimal. Underlying this result is the inability
of domestic tax policy to target specific industries. Note, though, that in spite of GATT
regulations, nations often have access to both tax and trade policy. Even with tax and
trade policy available, the government is still in a second-best situation. While trade
policy allows the net tax or subsidy on domestic production to be industry-specific, the
tax or subsidy on production abroad, t3, remains constant across industries. In what
follows, we investigate optimal tax and trade policy when trade, but not tax. policy can
be industry-specific.
The non-strategic industry faces an effective tax rate of t1 on its domestic production,
while the effective tax rate on the strategic industry's output is now denoted T1 . Output
produced abroad is still taxed or subsidized at rate t3 regardless of industry.
The home government sets t, t1, and T1 independently yielding the following first
order conditions.
Ti 2+taI + t 3 (Q
Oqi _ pq8Q
Ti 1+ t 3a =_-Qr11p 1p
Differentiating the first order conditions for the non-strategic firm gives:
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Since (29) implies that f # 0, the optimal tax on domestic production in the non-
strategic industry, ti, is zero. Further, (27') places no restrictions on t3 , so henceforth only
(26) and (28) are considered. Imposing ti = 0, and solving for Ti and t;, we find.
(-QPjp ) I.+ + P) 3
= D ,(30,
=(-Qic3s) ~+ Q 2t* D (31,
where
D----- ---- (OQ- + Q 0Eta 8TT Dt3  &t3 /T <
It is straightforward to show that Tl and t3 remain subsidies. (i.e. They are negative
A much more striking result is obtained by subtracting t3 from T, as shown below.
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The entire term in square brackets equals zero and we are left with,
({- t-)= D <0. (32)
Since T' and t3 are always negative, (32) implies that the optimal subsidy on domestic
output by the strategic firm is always greater than or equal to the optimal subsidy on dfi
output. The intuition behind this finding is as follows. Since tax policy cannot discriminate
between industries, any subsidy to output abroad in the strategic industry entails an equal
subsidy to output abroad by the non-strategic industry. This subsidy to the non-strategic
industry produces a deadweight loss which must be weighed against the profit-shifting
that the subsidy induces in the strategic industry. T, on the other hand, is specific to the
strategic industry and does not produce any deadweight loss in the non-strategic industry.
Hence the subsidy on dfi output is smaller (in absolute value) than the subsidy to domestic
output in the strategic industry. The inability to target industry-specific tax treatment of
foreign-source income results in production inefficiency.
In practice, the pattern of T1 < t3 < ti can be achieved in a number of different ways.
One scheme would provide preferential treatment to domestic-source income, but then
levy an export tax targeted to the non-strategic sector that is sufficiently high that its
domestic output is taxed relative to both the domestic output of the strategic sector and
all dfi output. Alternatively, foreign source income could receive preferential tax treatment
compared to domestic income, while domestic output of the strategic sector receives an
export subsidy that is generous enough to make it, all in all, tax preferred to both foreign
output and domestic output of the non-strategic sector. This latter scenario bears a more
than passing resemblance to tax and trade policy as they are actually practiced in several
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developed countries. For example, Japan gives preferential tax treatment to foreign-source
income, and is frequently perceived to provide substantial (indirect) export subsidies to
strategic industries.
4. Conclusions
Suppose that there are certain industries for which subsidization can successfully cause
a shift of pre-tax profits from foreign to domestic firms, and certain industries for which
this would be ineffective. In this case, in the context of our simple model, the optimal
industry-specific policy is straightforward - subsidize the former set of industries (which
we call "strategic") and don't subsidize the latter ("non-strategic") ones. Furthermore, set
the subsidies so that there is no fiscal incentive to locate production either domestically
or abroad.
In the absence of industry-specific policies, the usual policy prescription that optimal
policy does not introduce locational distortions is abandoned. If policy must be completely
industry-blind, then optimal policy will favor production where output of the strategic sec-
tor is relatively more responsive, in order to maximize the strategic gains net of the excess
burden created. If tariff (but not tax) policy can be made industry-specific, net subsidies
will favor domestic production of the strategic industry, ignore domestic production of the
non-strategic industry, and subsidize foreign output at a lower rate than domestic output
of the strategic sector. The ability to effectively target the subsidy on domestic output
makes it a more effective instrument than the subsidy on foreign output, which cannot be
targeted to strategic sectors.
The optimal policy described here could be implemented by having a preferential tax
rate on foreign income combined with an export subsidy targeted to the strategic sector
Note, though, that in no case does the optimal tax on foreign-source income depend on the
rate imposed by the host country, thus ruling out widespread schemes such as the limited
foreign tax credit under which t3 = max(ti - t1, 0). Credit-type tax systems, though.
frequently emerge as an optimal outcome when investigating multilateral tax policy under
perfect competition. While we show that credit-type schemes do not emerge as optimal
unilateral policy under imperfect competition. extending our analysis to multilateral con-
cerns is a potentially rich direction for future research For example, how should post-1902
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Europe structure tax and trade policy if their objective is aggregate European welfare?
Of course, one must be extremely careful in drawing any policy conclusions from stylized
models such as those presented in this paper. Nevertheless, exercises of this type can be
valuable in framing the policy debate by clarifying the economic conditions which must
exist in order for policy intervention to be potentially advantageous.
Finally, we hope this paper works toward convincing researchers of the need to integrate
public economics, international trade, and industrial organization when considering policy
affecting today's global corporation.
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Appendix
Comparative statics results used in section 2:
8Q1  C13(2P'(C..~ + CTS) - C21/ C211)
wheeID = (2Pl(Cg1 1 +C" ) - Cl, c« l(2Pz (-2 + C23) - C;2C' 3j - (Pi(Ci', ± Ci')J(Pi (C" + C±
which is positive by the sta ility conditions of (11~).'
<0.- D((:1=)
913 -1 IDC'-+l )
13, - - (C 23 .C3)> 0.(A3)
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where (El (21 - Cl'1 )(2P1 - C1'3) - (2F'1')(2P,') =Cii Ci - 2Pi C; , - 2P11 C;3~ > 0. Similarly,
8t.3 =El <(0. (.act
8
3
and ~-' is ambiguously signed.
Additional comparative statics results used in section 3:
891 qi =-l-1< 0. (143
8g1 8q1, _l1
22)
